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The liability of foreignness in capital markets: Sources and remedies 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The accelerating pace of global capital market integration has provided new opportunities for firms to 
raise capital abroad through global debt issues, cross-listings and initial public offerings in foreign stock 
exchanges.  However, existing empirical evidence suggests that foreign firms tend to be at a disadvantage 
compared to domestic firms, and they often suffer from investors’ “home bias”. The objective of this 
paper is to understand why firms are facing problems when accessing capital in foreign markets, and 
possible mechanism that can help to mitigate these problems. It expands the Liability of Foreignness 
(LOF) research beyond the product market domain to include liabilities faced by firms attempting to 
secure resources in foreign capital markets. We identify key differences between product and capital 
markets related to information environment, time structure of transactions, and linkages between buyers 
and sellers. We analyze institutional distance, information asymmetry, unfamiliarity, and cultural 
differences as the main sources of capital market LOF (CMLOF).  We suggest possible mechanisms 
managers can employ to mitigate CMLOF and overcome investors’ “home bias”, including bonding, 
signaling, organizational isomorphism, and reputational endorsements.  We also outline directions for 
further theoretical and empirical development of the CMLOF research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words:  Liability of Foreignness, Institutional theory, Institutional Context, Capital Markets
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INTRODUCTION 
 The accelerating pace of global capital market integration in the last two decades has had a 
profound impact on the strategies of firms accessing capital resources.  Today, with the lowering of 
institutional barriers, cross-border equity capital flows occur in a variety of ways such as foreign portfolio 
investment, cross-listings, and initial public offerings in foreign stock exchanges.  Similarly, firms are 
increasingly looking outside of their home markets for debt finance and for Venture Capital (VC) 
resources (Gozzi, Levine, & Schmukler, 2010; Makela & Maula, 2008).  However, recent international 
finance studies suggest that foreign firms tend to be at a disadvantage in that they are likely to experience 
higher cost of capital, lower liquidity, and less analyst coverage (Blass & Yafeh, 2001) than the local 
firms against whom they compete for resources in host capital markets.  Further, a number of foreign 
firms have been found to withdraw shortly after entering host capital markets.  Extant literature, however, 
provides only limited theoretical understanding about the underlying factors that cause foreign firms to 
experience higher costs associated with being foreign in host capital markets.  This, in turn, has resulted 
in limited ability to identify potential remedies foreign firms can deploy to mitigate these costs. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to understand why firms are facing problems when accessing 
capital in foreign markets. By doing this, we expand the domain of the liabilities of foreignness (LOF) 
research to the context of liabilities faced by firms accessing host country capital markets
i
.  Throughout 
the rest of this paper, we refer to these liabilities as capital market liabilities of foreignness, or CMLOF.  
Our focus is on the sources of CMLOF and potential remedies firms approaching foreign capital markets 
can deploy to reduce these liabilities. 
 The conceptualization and analysis of LOF in international business (IB) research were 
essentially developed in the context of firms expanding their products, services, and operations to other 
countries.  To date, a significant body of theoretical and empirical research has accumulated evaluating 
the sources of LOF that foreign firms face in host countries, compared to local firms (Caves, 1971; 
Hymer, 1976).  IB scholars consider LOF as the “fundamental assumption driving theories of the 
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multinational enterprise” (Zaheer, 1995: 341), and an understanding of LOF is usually associated with 
issues such as the local lack of knowledge of the foreign firm’s products and brand, and cultural 
differences in management practices that ultimately lead to foreign firms competing at a disadvantage and 
underperforming against local competitors in host markets.  While this may have been adequate in an era 
when internationalization was understood almost exclusively as globalization of product markets, the 
increasing integration of capital markets adds a new dimension to internationalization where a firm, in 
addition to selling its product and services to foreign customers, may also attempt to raise equity, debt, or 
VC resources from  foreign investors.  A number of studies in IB and finance demonstrate that investors 
in both developed and developing markets strongly prefer to invest in local firms rather than foreign firms 
in capital markets (Ke, Ng, & Wang, 2010).  This "home bias” puzzle, first documented by French and 
Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995), is one of the major research questions in international 
finance, but there is a paucity of studies that provide a comprehensive analysis of factors contributing to 
this phenomenon, as well as possible remedies firms may use to overcome home bias when raising 
finance globally.  
   This paper makes a number of contributions to both IB and international finance research.  First, 
we show how LOF framework may be usefully deployed within international finance research, and we 
provide arguments that justify a specific focus on capital markets as opposed to markets for products and 
services. These markets differ significantly in terms of information environment, time structure of 
transactions, and linkages between buyers and sellers, which suggests that the nature and sources of LOF 
in the two markets may be different.  Buyers in capital markets expect to obtain long-term rents, and they 
may be particularly sensitive to both short-term (e.g., adverse selection) and long-term (e.g., moral 
hazard) agency costs associated with a seller.  As a result, liabilities of foreignness associated with selling 
financial securities abroad may be less transaction-specific and depend on the long-term buyers’ 
expectations with regard to an issuer.  Although research in IB has long recognized that firms face LOF 
when competing abroad, both international business and finance researchers do not provide a 
comprehensive theoretical explanation as to how the disadvantages that firms face in foreign capital 
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markets in comparison to local firms may be different or similar to disadvantages in product markets.  
The major theoretical contribution of our paper lies in addressing this previously neglected, but 
increasingly important issue.   
Our second contribution is related to the analysis of root causes of CMLOF, which extends 
traditional LOF research and international finance studies by integrating them with institutional theory.  
We develop a framework that includes the costs facing firms in host country capital markets and the 
willingness of host market investors to devote resources to outside firms. We classify these costs as 
arising out of institutional distance, difficulties in information gathering, unfamiliarity, and cultural 
distance, and argue that these factors may be particularly important sources of the CMLOF. More 
specifically, we explain how CMLOF costs may be driven by underlying institutional differences between 
home and host markets.  Similarly, information flows are an important determinant of cross-border capital 
transactions (Portes & Rey, 2005).  Likewise, unfamiliarity amongst potential investors is likely to impact 
international equity, debt, and VC transactions.  Finally, it is quite plausible that cultural differences 
between countries will influence a wide range of capital market transactions (Guiso, Sapienza, & 
Zingales, 2009) and ultimately impact the performance of foreign firms in host capital markets relative to 
local competitors.  Previous IB research on LOF in product markets provides useful guidance in terms of 
potential effects of some of these factors.  However, it does not offer a comprehensive theoretical 
framework analyzing how liability of foreignness in capital markets affects financing decisions which 
would be highly relevant to both IB and international finance studies.  
Finally, if there are indeed fundamental differences in the sources of LOF between product and 
capital markets, then researchers need to re-think possible solutions foreign firms may deploy to minimize 
these liabilities.  Although international finance research has identified several specific liabilities that 
firms encounter when seeking resources in foreign capital markets, it is yet to develop a comprehensive 
analysis of measures foreign issuers can deploy to minimize these liabilities. Navigating the dynamic 
international capital market environment and attracting capital market resource providers located in 
dissimilar cultural and institutional environments is a difficult challenge facing the international manager.  
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Just as managers must contend with liabilities of foreignness in product markets, they must also be aware 
of the sources of CMLOF and be prepared to mitigate the resulting costs.  If liabilities of foreignness are 
prevalent in the capital markets, it has implications for a firm’s cost of capital and firm value (Stulz, 
1999).  Therefore, we make a further contribution by focusing on issues related to organizational 
legitimacy and identify a number of possible mechanisms managers can employ to mitigate CMLOF and 
overcome “home bias” in a host country’s capital markets.  These include bonding and signaling 
activities, organizational isomorphism, and endorsements by third parties.  Although IB studies have 
identified some potential remedies of LOF when exploring firms’ global product market strategies, we 
contend that our analysis may be equally important within international management and finance research 
focused on globalization of capital markets.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss differences 
between product and capital markets in terms of liabilities of foreignness that firms may face when 
entering these markets. The following section introduces our theoretical model and discussion of sources 
of the CMLOF, including institutional distance, information costs, unfamiliarity costs and cultural 
differences. The next section discusses strategies for overcoming CMLOF.  Finally, in addition to 
addressing CMLOF costs and strategies to mitigate their effects, investigating the internationalization of 
firms through capital markets can help to answer why firms engage in foreign expansion despite the 
prevalence of these costs that put them at a competitive disadvantage relative to local firms.  In the last 
section, we offer a research agenda for the future investigation of CMLOF and conclude by discussing the 
implications for further research and theory development.  
LIABILITY OF FOREIGNNESS IN CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
 The origins of the concept of LOF can be traced back to the works of Hymer (1976) who laid out 
the theoretical reasons why foreign firms are likely to incur additional costs that local firms would not 
incur and face competitive disadvantages.  Hymer (1976) argued that foreign subsidiaries experience a 
competitive disadvantage due to fact that local firms have better information about the local competitive 
environment, including the economy, language, social needs and preferences, law, and politics.  The study 
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of the systematic liabilities encountered by populations of firms due to factors that are by and large out of 
their control has parallels in population ecology research where considerable attention has been paid to 
the twin concepts of liabilities of newness and liabilities of smallness.  Given the conceptual similarities 
between LOF and these other types of liabilities, Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997: 440) suggest, “liability 
of foreignness might need to stand alongside the other liabilities of age and size.” 
The most widely used definition of LOF in the literature is provided by Zaheer (1995: 343) who 
considers LOF as “all additional costs a firm operating in  a market overseas incurs that a local firm 
would not incur.”  The focus of LOF is on the subtle structural/relational and institutional costs, or the 
social costs of access and acceptance.  These social costs arise from unfamiliarity, relational, and 
discriminatory hazards with institutional distance as the key driver behind each of these costs (Eden & 
Miller, 2004).   
 The cumulative empirical evidence of prior research implies that, at least among firms competing 
in the product market domain, foreign-owned firms are expected to have lower profitability and a lower 
survival rate than local firms, ceteris paribus (see, e.g., Lord & Ranft, 2000; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 
1997).  It also suggests that LOF is prevalent across a wide range of product and service related industries 
such as banking, automobiles, and currency trading (Mezias, 2002) and that LOF has a negative impact 
on firm performance (Miller & Parkhe, 2002).  
Sources of Liabilities of Foreignness and Mechanisms to Overcome Them 
Based on a review of prior literature, Zaheer (1995) identified at least four sources of costs that 
put a foreign firm at a competitive disadvantage with local firms.  First, these are spatial costs, which 
relate to costs arising from transportation and coordination.  Even in a world where technology has shrunk 
distance and time, these costs are non-trivial.  Second, there are costs that arise because of a firm’s 
unfamiliarity with the local environment.  As Caves (1971: 5) points out, “the foreign firm must pay 
dearly for what the native has acquired at no cost to the firm…..or can acquire more cheaply” as a result  
of its knowledge of the host country.  Third, there are costs resulting from the host country environment 
due to the lack of legitimacy of the foreign firm as well as the prevalence of economic nationalism in 
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many countries.  In addition, local consumers may be not familiar with the foreign firm’s brand and 
products, and they would lean towards buying more familiar local brands even when their quality and 
prices do not match foreign entrants.  Finally, there are costs arising out of the home country environment 
as well.  For example, these may include restrictions on high technology exports, embargos on trade, and 
investment against specific countries among others. 
 Considerable empirical research has concentrated on the question of what firms can do to 
overcome LOF.  Zaheer (1995) suggested mimicking the administrative practices of local firms as a 
possible response.  Other suggestions include the choice of an appropriate entry mode (Eden & Miller, 
2004), a combination of offensive (networking, legitimacy improvement) and defensive (contracts, output 
standardization) strategies (Luo, Shenkar & Nyaw, 2002) and the use of firm specific resources to 
outperform local rivals (Nachum, 2003).  
 Our review of LOF literature suggests that both its theoretical development and empirical 
analyses have been mostly confined to LOF associated with a product market entry by a foreign firm. 
However, firms often need external financial resources in order to capitalize on growth opportunities 
provided by their chosen product markets.  The equity capital raised on the stock market is usually 
cheaper than private money and publicly traded shares are a useful currency in making acquisitions and 
helping a company to grow.  Given the rapid globalization of capital markets, it is important to explore 
whether LOF applies to capital markets.  And if it does, it is equally important to identify the sources of 
LOF in capital markets as well as the specific strategies that firms can pursue to reduce such liabilities.   
Distinctions between Product and Capital Markets 
Although there are many similarities between product and capital markets, there are also a 
number of important distinctions between them.  Foremost among them are differences in information 
production, types of goods traded, the nature of the ongoing linkage between the buyers and sellers, and 
information intensity.  First, product markets are characterized by consumption goods, whereas capital 
markets engage in the trading of investment and debt products.  Although the seller’s reputation is 
important in both markets, there are significant differences in terms of its effects on the buyers’ 
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perceptions.  More specifically, buyers of products associate reputation with the quality and durability of 
goods, whereas investors in stocks, bonds and other capital market instruments associate issuers’ 
reputation with expected streams of future dividend and interest payments as well as potential 
appreciation of their investment in time.  Second, the information production environments differ between 
the two markets.  Capital markets can be largely considered as mediated markets in the sense that 
participants rely greatly upon endorsements by key third parties, such as investment banks, brokers, and 
investment analysts for information production.     
Third, in the case of product markets, although organizational and product characteristics shape 
the purchasing decisions of buyers, once the purchase is completed the buyer’s focus turns to the product 
itself rather than the producer.  On the other hand, the connections that buyers of capital market securities 
have with issuers continue long after the sale, whether in primary or secondary markets.  For instance, 
debt instruments involve scheduled payments of interest and loan principal over a certain period of time.  
Equities represent residual claim rights that, in theory, are valid throughout the firm’s life span.  The 
underlying value to buyers of both of these types of capital market securities is tied to the current and 
future activities of the issuer.  Finally, along with differences in linkages, product and capital markets 
differ in terms of information intensity.  Product markets typically involve one-time collection of 
information prior to purchase decisions.  Capital markets, on the other hand, are extremely information 
intensive, especially in the periods after a particular security has been sold as the price of capital market 
instruments constantly change reflecting new information that becomes available.   
Capital Markets and the Liabilities of Foreignness 
The increasing integration of global capital markets now makes it easier for firms to raise both 
debt and equity capital from locations outside their home countries.  This trend towards financial 
globalization has been facilitated by a number of regulatory and institutional developments.  First, the 
establishment of stock exchanges in several major financial centers requiring lower levels of transparency 
of listed firms has enabled the entry of small and medium sized firms into global capital markets
ii
.  
Second, changes in regulations in many countries have given investors the opportunity to invest in foreign 
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equities.  There is a variety of reasons why firms choose to seek equity financing outside of the home 
markets.  In addition to the financial benefits, marketing and public relations benefits, political benefits, 
and employee relations benefits have been pointed out (Mittoo, 1992; Saudagaran, 1988).  A successful 
listing in the U.S. can enhance operations or sales in the U.S., enhance analyst coverage, and provide 
firms with larger amounts of capital in order to pursue growth and acquisition strategies (see Karolyi, 
2006 for a comprehensive review of the literature on foreign listings).  By listing in a foreign market, 
firms can obtain access to more liquid markets, more easily attract debt capital at lower costs and better 
terms, and tap into a wider investor base than they would have in their home capital market (Claessens, & 
Schmukler, 2007).  
 LOF is inherently a relative construct in that its degree can only be assessed relative to host 
country competitors (Mezias, 2002).  There is growing evidence regarding the prevalence of CMLOF in 
all types of capital markets, namely equity, debt, and venture capital.  Yet, understanding what forms 
these liabilities can take and identifying their sources are vital to developing strategies for overcoming 
them.  These liabilities may manifest in the form of higher costs of raising capital, lower liquidity of its 
securities, and tighter regulation of foreign firm’s securities compared to their local counterparts.  We 
discuss the manifestations of CMLOF in different capital market contexts below. 
Equity Markets.  A number of empirical studies suggest that firms face a variety of challenges in foreign 
equity markets compared to their local counterparts.  Firms raising equity in a host country capital market 
may have to “underprice” its shares (Francis et al., 2010).  Also, they could potentially pay higher 
underwriting fees, pay higher professional fees (e.g. costs to secure the services of legal advisors, auditors 
and independent directors), or higher initial listing fees, than local firms.  For example, Bronson, Ghosh, 
and Hogan (2009) found that, after controlling for home country litigation environment, audit fees for 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. are 23 percent higher than those for U.S. firms.  Similarly, differences in 
analyst coverage may result in lower trading volume, and therefore, reduced liquidity.  Foreign firms 
experience difficulties in making themselves known to local investors (Bruner, Chaplinsky, & 
Ramchand,1999).  In addition, foreign firms are subject to a greater frequency of lawsuits than local firms 
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(Bhattacharya, Galpin, & Haslem, 2007).  Even more compelling evidence of CMLOF comes from a 
recent study by Frésard and Salva, (2010) who found strong support for the prevalence of a “foreign firm 
discount” relative to host market firms.  They found that “All else being equal, the value of foreign firms 
with shares cross-listed on U.S. exchanges is around 14 percent lower than that of similar U.S. firms” 
(Frésard & Salva, (2010: 2).  Their results are consistent with the findings of Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2009).  Also, King and Segal (2008) show that Canadian firms that cross-list on U.S. stock 
exchanges experience a country discount relative to U.S. firms.  Foreign firms may also be subject to 
more restrictive regulation than domestic firms.  For example, the Russian firm Severstal was not allowed 
to issue shares to retail investors during an IPO in Hong Kong although it listed its shares in the local 
stock exchange.   
Debt Markets.  The largest component of the international capital market is the bond market.  Between 
1991-2005, 35% of all capital raised through debt issues was raised in markets other than the firm's home 
market (Gozzi, Levine, & Schmukler, 2010).  Foreign firms raise significantly more debt than equity in 
the U.S. (Chaplinsky & Ramchand, 2004).  Despite the well-documented attractions of global debt 
markets such as lower costs and lower underwriter compensation (Miller & Puthenpurackal, 2005) 
research also clearly shows that foreign firms are at a disadvantage compared to local firms in foreign 
debt markets.  Indeed, there is extensive evidence that firms suffer from home bias when they try to 
source debt outside of their home market (Tesar & Werner, 1995).  Atilgan, Ghosh, and Zhang (2010) 
found that not only do cross-listed bonds have lower initial ratings, but they are also less likely to be 
upgraded and take longer to be upgraded compared to U.S. domestic bonds with similar issuer and issue 
characteristics.  These lower ratings are one of the clear manifestations of the prevalence of CMLOF in 
bond markets.   
Venture Capital Markets.  A growing body of research point to a number of factors that contribute to 
VCs choosing to make local rather than distant investments (Makela & Maula, 2008).  Foremost among 
these reasons is the fact that VC firms tend to be deficient in local knowledge and lack of local network 
support.  To protect their reputation and networks VCs favor local rather than distant ventures (Cumming 
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& Dai, 2010).  Trust may affect VCs’ international investment choices and institutional and cultural 
factors determine VC success internationally. Research has shown that cultural differences and 
geographical distance can create problems in cross-border VC investments and can diminish the 
commitment of venture capitalists in foreign markets (Mäkelä & Maula, 2008).  Finally, due to the 
liability of foreignness, international VC firms originate fewer unsolicited deals from networks compared 
to domestic VCs (Qing & Hwang, 2010).  Thus, a firm seeking venture capital outside of the country is 
likely to experience CMLOF either in terms of greater difficulty in obtaining capital, or less guidance by 
VC syndicates.   
 Despite the integration of capital markets, and the lowering of formal institutional barriers that 
have historically limited foreign ownership of firms around the world, finance researchers have 
consistently found that investors do not take advantage of the diversification benefits of foreign securities. 
For example, studies have shown that U.S. investors hold about 91 percent of their stock investments in 
domestic stocks—despite the fact that U.S. stocks represent only 49 percent of the world market portfolio 
(French & Poterba, 1991).  Although economic theory suggests that international diversification would 
reduce portfolio risk, it has been repeatedly documented in the finance literature that both professional 
and individual investors hold too small portions of their wealth in foreign assets because of their 
preference for domestic over foreign assets (Cooper & Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar & Werner, 1995).  Evidence 
by Chan et al. (2005) shows that the phenomenon is pervasive across 48 developed and developing 
countries worldwide.  This is particularly intriguing because, unlike the trade in goods, transactions in 
financial markets do not incur spatial costs as there are low transportation costs.  The preference shown 
by investors to overweight their portfolios with local securities and underweight foreign securities is 
generally referred to as “home bias” (French & Poterba, 1991).  Even if a Chinese or Mexican firm lists 
its securities in the US or UK capital markets, investors in these countries still consider these as foreign 
securities because they are issued by foreign firms and may still continue to underweight them in their 
portfolios.  This, in turn, can lead to lower trading volumes, lower security prices, and hence higher cost 
of capital.   
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 ANTECEDENTS OF LIABILITIES OF FOREIGNNESS IN CAPITAL MARKETS 
 Foreign firms issuing securities overseas have to comply with a host market’s security rules and 
regulations in the same way as local firms.  However, their headquarters, operations, and business 
networks are often located in countries with different cultural and institutional environments.  They also 
have to involve a wide range of intermediaries (e.g., bank-underwriters, rating agencies, etc.) to facilitate 
their approach to foreign investors.  These factors, in addition to the transactional characteristics of a 
particular security, may affect investors’ perceptions of the quality of the foreign firm’s securities, and, 
ultimately, its CMLOF.  They also may explain “home bias” identified in previous research. 
 Why would investors, who are assumed to be rational, forego the obvious benefits of portfolio 
diversification and continue to invest most of their funds in home markets?  More importantly, how does 
the pervasive ‘home bias’ phenomenon impact the costs firms incur in their international capital raising 
activities?  A number of explanations have been offered for the puzzling persistence of such suboptimal 
behavior by investors and these explanations provide valuable insights regarding the liabilities faced by 
firms in capital markets.  Building on previous research on home bias in capital markets, we identify at 
least four major sources of CMLOF costs. These are institutional distance, information asymmetry, 
unfamiliarity, and cultural differences (Cai & Warnock, 2004; Chan et al., 2005; Tesar & Werner, 1995).  
Each of these is discussed next.  We summarize these costs on the left side of our model in Figure 1.  
---------------------------------------- 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Institutional Distance 
 Scott (1995: 33) defines institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and 
activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior.”  Institutional distance is defined as the 
degree of separation or extent to which institutions differ between countries (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
Substantial institutional differences create difficulties for foreign firms attempting to achieve legitimacy 
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in a host country (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Of the three dimensions of institutional environment 
mentioned above, the regulatory dimension is particularly salient in explaining LOF in capital markets.  
The regulatory dimension consists of the rules and laws that provide support for product and capital 
market participants and facilitate firms’ efforts to acquire resources.  A country’s regulatory dimension 
can provide support for firms, including governmental regulations that structure competition within 
industries and rules and policies that structure transactions within capital markets.  Regulative distance 
describes the differences in the general legal environments between home and host countries and higher 
regulative distance between two countries can discourage investors from one country to invest in 
another.
iii
   
It is generally understood that when investors perceive that the risks and costs of acquiring and 
holding equities issued by foreign firms are sufficiently higher than they are for local securities, they will 
choose to keep their focus on local firms.  These risks and costs arise primarily due to institutional 
differences between home and host country capital markets.  For example, protections afforded to 
minority investors may be less in a foreign country compared to the investor’s home country.  As a result, 
investors would expect to be compensated for their higher risk through higher returns.  In addition, when 
a firm comes from an institutionally distant country, host country investors may lack understanding of 
informal institutional settings in the home country, such as the level of corruption, and the importance of 
informal networks.  Again, these factors increase risks and uncertainty associated with a foreign firm’s 
equity, and, consequently, its CMLOF.  There may be costs resulting from institutional barriers to trade 
assets.  Each of these problems reduces the expected returns on foreign firms’ assets relative to domestic 
assets, and hence, increases CMLOF for foreign issuers.  
Despite the lowering of formal institutional barriers in recent years, research shows that home 
bias still remains.  Studies by French and Poterba (1991), Tesar and Werner (1995), and Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1994) demonstrate that empirical support for a cost-based explanation for home bias is 
generally poor.  The consensus is that differences in legal frameworks concerning, for example, 
accounting systems, corporate governance, restrictive investment regulations, or investor protection 
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persist and can likely explain at least part of the home bias (Chan et al., 2005).  For example, Cai and 
Warnock (2006) found that the lower the level of investor protection in a country, the higher the home 
bias that firms from these countries would experience in foreign capital markets.  Similarly, Ferreira and 
Matos (2008) found that institutional investors prefer stocks from countries with strong disclosure 
standards. 
 Similar logic applies when local investors provide capital to overseas companies. Although in 
theory there is no difference between the characteristics of securities issued by a foreign company in a 
host capital market and those issued by local companies, investors’ sentiments towards these financial 
instruments may be driven by regulatory differences and costs associated with the foreign firm’s country 
of origin. In particular, differences in the investor protection regimes may be translated into substantial 
CMLOF costs for companies coming from less “investor-friendly” countries.  Hence, we suggest: 
Proposition 1: There is a positive relationship between the institutional distance between 
a home and host country and the extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm. 
 
Information Costs 
Finance researchers refer to information asymmetries to explain the puzzle of home bias in 
particular and patterns of transnational portfolio investments in general (Portes & Rey, 2005).  
Information asymmetry is present whenever one party in a transaction has more or better information than 
the other.  In international financial markets, there is greater potential for an unequal distribution of 
information between national and foreign investors.  An important source of such asymmetry is 
uncertainties regarding the codified rules regulating the behavior and activities of company insiders in 
foreign markets.  In addition, information such as business practices and conventions, national cultures, 
and corporate cultures are required for investors to meaningfully evaluate foreign financial assets, but 
such information is often difficult to obtain and even more difficult to interpret.   
In sum, local investors have better knowledge than their foreign counterparts about domestic 
firms.  Investors often face high barriers to access information when attempting to evaluate foreign assets.  
Empirical evidence clearly suggests that information costs do indeed affect the composition of investors’ 
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portfolios. For example, it has been found that foreign equity portfolios are skewed towards the equities 
of large firms (Kang & Stulz, 1997), information flows are an important determinant of cross-border 
equity transactions (Portes & Rey, 2005).  These studies suggest that asymmetric information between 
local and non-local investors are an important factor for investment decisions.  The logic of the above 
arguments that investors exhibit a home bias because of the prevalence of information asymmetries is 
equally applicable to decisions to invest in the equities of a foreign firm even if it is listed in the domestic 
stock exchange.  Hence: 
Proposition 2: There is a positive relationship between the host market investors’ 
information costs and the extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm.  
 
Unfamiliarity Costs 
 Along with information costs, research has shown that firms must also contend with the fact that 
investors do not invest in firms they are not familiar with.  It is found that investors tend to invest in a 
subset of eligible securities that they are familiar with, a phenomenon often referred to as a ‘habitat effect’ 
(Barberis, Shleifer, & Wurgler, 2005). Unfamiliarity costs are distinct from information costs in the sense 
that even if information costs are the same, when investors are choosing between two firms, they would 
prefer the firms that are relatively more familiar to them.  Familiarity may arise from proximity, 
patriotism, name recognition, or a variety of other factors.  Interestingly, familiarity can often have 
negative effects on returns.  For example, Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) find strong support for irrational 
familiarity by revealing the overweighting of investment portfolios in investors’ home markets, and under 
diversifying the capital that is left for foreign investment across a selected few “familiar” international 
markets.  
 Research also shows that the familiarity bias or local bias often manifests as a preference for 
geographic proximity.  Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that a geographic proximity effect works 
even within U.S. domestic stock portfolios. These authors demonstrate that mutual fund managers prefer 
to invest in firms headquartered close to their home cities.  It has been shown that social identity 
triggered by group affiliations drives under-diversified and domestically biased portfolios.  Investors 
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often prefer domestic assets to mimic the economic fortunes and welfare of their neighbors, countrymen, 
and social reference group.  That emotions related to identity and nationalism may actually trump pure 
rationality in investment decisions is further evidenced by the “patriotism” in portfolio allocation 
decisions of U.S. investors reported by Morse and Shive (2007).  This geographical bias suggests that 
investors will be particularly apprehensive when it comes to buying securities issued by foreign firms.  
This lack of familiarity can contribute to CMLOF costs. 
 Familiarity matters also at security level investment decisions and the decision to seek foreign 
capital.  The important role familiarity plays in investment decisions has been extensively studied in 
recent years.  Kang and Stulz (1997) show that foreign investors in Japan prefer large, international 
manufacturing firms.  In a recent study of a large number of international funds with holdings in 11 
developed countries, Covrig, Lau, and Ng (2006) investigated stock selection by domestic and foreign 
fund managers and found that domestic managers typically prefer smaller, high market-to-book firms.  On 
the other hand, Cai and Warnock (2004) analyze foreign and domestic institutions’ positions in US 
securities and find that both foreigners and domestic investors prefer large, internationally diversified 
firms. Therefore, foreign companies that do not fall under these categories may face additional costs of 
raising capital on a local capital market, hence increasing its CMLOF costs. 
Familiarity with foreign markets on the part of managers plays a role in their decision on whether 
to seek capital resources abroad or where to seek it.  For example, Sarkissian and Schill (2004) find that 
geographic proximity of the foreign market play a dominant role in selecting overseas listing destinations.  
In addition, the international experience of top management teams, international scope of operations, and 
industry have all been shown to be factors which prompt firms to seek equity resources outside their local 
capital markets (Blass & Yafeh, 2001; Hursti & Maula, 2007).  While these findings suggest that 
internationalization increases the firm’s visibility and decreases investors’ unfamiliarity costs, research 
evidence clearly support the argument that investors prefer firms they are familiar with and that such 
familiarity often arises from size and proximity.  Clearly, these place foreign firms at a distinct 
disadvantage in host country capital markets.  Therefore, we suggest: 
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Proposition 3: There is a positive relationship between host market investor unfamiliarity 
with the foreign firm and its home country and the extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign 
firm.  
 
Cultural Differences  
 Culture is often defined as a system of shared values, beliefs, and attitudes that influences 
individual perceptions and behaviors.  Until very recently, nearly all research in economics has 
endogenized beliefs, under the rational expectations assumption that subjective and objective beliefs 
coincide (Guiso et al., 2009).  However, in recent years, there has been a growing recognition that culture 
affects both economic exchange and outcomes by affecting expectations and preferences.  Prominent 
among these studies is a new strand of literature that shows that perceptions rooted in culture are 
important and generally omitted determinants of economic exchange (Guiso et al., 2009).  Indeed, culture 
affects the level of trust and nature of financial contracting.  For example, level of trust may be related to 
amount of trade, portfolio investment, and direct investment.  Trust within a country also affects 
household and firm level investment and lack of trust can affect stock market participation rates.  Given 
the importance of culture in economic exchange, it is only natural that cultural differences between 
countries will have a significant impact on a wide variety of cross-border economic transactions.     
Few concepts in international business have attracted as much application in diverse areas of 
research as cultural distance (Kogut & Singh, 1988).  As Shenkar (2001) points out, the cultural distance 
construct has been applied to multiple research questions from innovation and transformation to foreign 
expansion and the ease of transferring technology across borders.  While the impact of cultural difference 
on consumer and organizational behavior has received considerable research attention, it is increasingly 
being recognized that it may play an equally important effect on investor behavior.    
In one of the first studies examining the importance of culture and investment behavior, Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2000) found that investors are more likely to hold, buy, and sell the stocks of firms that 
are located close to the investor, that communicate in the investor’s native tongue, and have chief 
executives of the same cultural background.  Subsequent studies have supported these findings. Morse 
and Shive (2007) show that cultures with high levels of patriotism have larger proportion of their 
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investments allocated at home.  More recently Anderson et al. (2011: 930) found that “culture impacts 
investor behavior directly” even after controlling for geographical distance and regulatory differences. 
Additional support for culture’s impact on investor behavior is provided by Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) 
who find that more uncertainty avoiding societies are associated with lower levels of foreign equity 
investment and that societies with higher levels of individualism invest more in foreign equities.  
Likewise, Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) propose that cross-cultural differences in terms of individualism 
versus collectivism are related to trading activity levels and security pricing across countries.  Chan, 
Covrig and Ng (2005) find that portfolio allocations of mutual funds depend upon both cultural and 
economic familiarity.  When a country is more remote from the rest of the world and has a different 
language, foreign investors are reluctant to invest in that country.  On the other hand, when a country is 
more developed, larger in market capitalization, and has lower transaction costs, foreign investors will 
invest more.  Thus, a growing body of empirical evidence is accumulating that investor behavior is not 
entirely rational as originally believed and that cultural factors circumscribe investor rationality.  Cultural 
differences can play a significant role in an individual’s decision to invest in the stock of a company from 
a different country and can contribute to LOF costs even in financial markets. 
Proposition 4: There is a positive relationship between the cultural differences between 
the host country and home country and the extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm.  
 
 
MECHANISMS  FOR OVERCOMING LIABILITIES 
OF FOREIGNNESS IN CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
 The existence of liabilities stemming from foreignness makes it an imperative for firms accessing 
international capital markets to engage in strategies designed to overcome these liabilities.  While the 
problems of information asymmetry can be addressed to some extent with greater frequency and quality 
of disclosure and problems arising from unfamiliarity may diminish over time, one of the fundamental 
problems faced by foreign firms in international capital markets is what Schmidt and Sofka (2009) 
referred to as “legitimacy deficit.”  Attaining legitimate status is critical to both the short and long term 
success of firms in host capital markets.  In the case of firms attempting to acquire resources in a host 
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country capital market, legitimacy would be the perception that the firm is similar to other host country 
firms in that market, or would act in a manner consistent with shareholder wealth generation, or is 
endorsed by organizations that are known and trusted.  Legitimacy is particularly important in new 
ventures as it is critical to the ability to acquire other resources, including capital. This is because 
increased legitimacy has been associated with generating increased resource flows (Suchman, 1995). 
Hence, foreign firms have to engage in actions that increase their legitimacy in foreign capital markets.  
In this paper, we identify how four strategies - bonding, signaling, organizational isomorphism, and 
endorsements by reputable third parties - may moderate the relationship between the antecedent factors 
we discussed above and LOF in host capital markets.  These strategies can be found in the middle of our 
framework in Figure 1.   
Bonding 
 One of the biggest developments that have facilitated the entry of firms into global capital 
markets is the establishment of stock exchanges requiring lower levels of transparency.  For example, in 
1995 the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was established in the U.K. to cater to the capital demands 
of small and medium sized firms.  Since then, a number of the world’s exchanges have started new 
trading platforms modeled after London’s AIM market.  Yet, while firms have increased access to equity 
and credit markets around the world through exchanges requiring lower levels of governance and 
transparency, simply listing on these exchanges may do little to reduce CMLOF costs.  Starting with the 
influential papers by Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999), the foreign listing literature in finance has argued 
that firms incorporated in countries with poor investor protection can credibly bond themselves to better 
investor protection by offering their shares in host markets with higher standards of investor protection.  
Offering shares on overseas markets as a means to improve a firm’s corporate governance systems is 
often referred to as the ‘bonding hypothesis’.  Under the bonding hypothesis, opting for a listing in a more 
demanding exchange provides a means for foreign issuers to credibly commit to stricter regulation and 
the protection of investor rights against managerial self-dealing or excess consumption of private benefits 
of control (Coffee, 1999).  In other words, offering shares on foreign exchanges can serve as a credible 
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bonding mechanism in that the firm will be subject to the increased scrutiny of multiple external monitors 
in the cross listing country.  Even more important than the decision to list in a foreign market is the choice 
of the specific exchange.  Different exchanges even within a country have different disclosure 
requirements and therefore in order to “bond” a firm will have to list its securities in an exchange that 
demands very high standards of disclosure and governance. 
A number of studies show that bonding can help mitigate the costs firms face in foreign capital 
markets.  Reese and Weisbach (2002) found that firms from countries with poor legal protections were 
more likely to list in the U.S. and, especially, on major U.S. exchanges.  Doidge et al. (2004) documents a 
“cross-listing premium” of 16 percent for firms around the world that choose to cross-list in the U.S.  Hail 
and Leuz (2009) found that firms with cross- listings on U.S. exchanges experience a decrease in their 
cost of capital between 70 and 120 basis points.  Further, King and Segal (2008) demonstrate that 
Canadian firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges reduce the country discount for Canadian firms relative to 
U.S. firms.  Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) suggest that issuers from countries with less 
efficient capital markets tend to offer in countries with better liquidity and greater financial reform.  
Ammer et al. (2005) have shown that while U.S. investors hold 3 percent of the typical foreign firm that is 
not cross-listed on a U.S. exchange, U.S. investors hold 17 percent of those foreign firms that have cross-
listed.  This clearly indicates that investors react favorably when the firm engages in bonding.  
 Foreign firms that list on US exchanges “bond” themselves to the US regulatory regime, which 
provides higher investor protection than the firm’s home market.  By committing to stricter regulation the 
firm can enjoy greater access to capital markets.  This occurs because, as Coffee (1999) argues, exposure 
to SEC enforcement and shareholder litigation decreases the principal-agency problem. Once foreign 
issuers list in capital markets that have stricter governance regulations than their own home market, the 
relative importance of variations between the corporate laws and corporate governance of different 
countries should decline in the minds of potential investors.  Studies have shown that firms originating in 
countries with low investor protection levels can achieve a range of benefits by listing in markets that 
uphold minority shareholder rights.  For example, listing in a host country with better investor protection 
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is associated with lower cost of capital (Hail & Leuz, 2009), more scrutiny by financial analysts (Lang et 
al., 2003), better access to external finance (Reese & Weisbach, 2002) and higher firm valuation (Doidge, 
et al., 2004).  Thus, in addition to seeking larger market capitalization, greater liquidity, higher valuations, 
performance and foreign sales, legal bonding is part of the international capital raising decision for a 
growing percentage of foreign firms (Claessens & Schmukler, 2007).  Hence: 
Proposition 5: Bonding on the part of the foreign firm negatively moderates the 
relationship between antecedent factors and the extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign 
firm.  
 
Signaling  
 Bonding hypothesis suggests that the firm may reduce its CMLOF by choosing a highly regulated 
host market.  However, even in less regulated markets a firm can mitigate negative effects of CMLOF by 
signaling its quality to investors. The importance of signals in capital markets has long been recognized, 
especially in research on the pricing of IPOs.  Researchers have focused upon uncovering a range of 
signals associated with the IPO firm that managers employ to convey its value to potential investors 
(Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Sanders & Boivie, 2004).  IPOs are characterized by 
information asymmetry in which owners have more complete information than investors regarding the 
quality of the firm.  We believe that many of the signals identified in IPO literature may be equally 
efficacious in reducing CMLOF. 
To combat the investors’ lack of information about a firm, a number of organizational attributes 
can serve as indicators of the value of an organization when it approaches public market investors. For 
example, IPO studies emphasize signaling properties of revealed risk (Beatty & Zajac, 1994), and the 
specific ways in which the proceeds of the issue would be used (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). In addition, 
corporate governance characteristics also have come to be regarded as important signals of governance 
quality.  The various such signals identified in IPO research include insider ownership (Certo, Daily, 
Cannella, & Dalton, 2003), equity ownership by outside directors and institutional block holders (Sanders 
& Boivie, 2004), and founder as CEO (Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). Board independence is 
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increasingly recognized as leading to more effective monitoring and hence can serve as a signal of good 
governance (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Good governance signals are costly and poor quality firms are 
less likely to spend their resources on trying to send these signals. Given that cross-listings and IPOs are 
the two primary means by which firms access foreign equity markets, a number of governance signals 
would prove to be useful in reducing the level of CMLOF experienced by a firm. By signaling its value 
through good corporate governance, the firm may differentiate itself from other firms from the same 
country, and, therefore, reduce costs associated with CMLOF.  Therefore, we suggest: 
Proposition 6: Signals of good governance on the part of the foreign firm negatively 
moderates the relationship between antecedent factors and the extent of CMLOF faced by 
a foreign firm. 
  
Organizational Isomorphism 
 Isomorphism in organizational fields is a central concept of institutional theory (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  Organizations seek to attain legitimacy through mimetic processes that result in their 
becoming similar to other organizations in an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Generally 
speaking, legitimacy may be considered a generalized perception that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs.  
Firms considered legitimate by market stakeholders tend to succeed more frequently in competitive 
capital markets (Suchman, 1995).  In fact, legitimacy is considered even more important for emerging 
firms entering a market because the organization’s chances of survival are significantly enhanced (Rao, 
1994).  Similarly, LOF studies have also emphasized the importance of mimicking, or conformity relative 
to local firms to the performance of foreign subsidiaries (Miller & Eden, 2006).  Zaheer (1995: 344) also 
highlights the importance of local isomorphism by suggesting that in the absence of firm-specific 
advantages, foreign firms need to “mimic the advantages of successful local firms.” 
 Foreign companies from specific industries can overcome information and knowledge gaps by 
opting for markets where investors and analysts have an understanding and proven expertise in these 
industries. Particularly in technology or higher-risk sectors, the availability of such skills may 
substantially affect the availability of equity finance and the terms at which it is available.  Better analyst 
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coverage of such industries is likely to broaden understanding in the primary market, promote investor 
interest, and ultimately deliver higher valuations of the companies. If industry expertise is an important 
determinant of where to list and raise capital, one would expect to observe companies in the same 
industry clustered in exchanges that deliver this expertise.  Previous studies have indeed found that 
companies opt for listings where industry peers are already present (Pagano et al., 2002) because of the 
low costs of information transfer. While the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges provide trading platforms 
for the largest number of leading high-technology companies whose shares enjoy worldwide visibility and 
liquidity, Toronto’s TSX and London’s AIM exchanges have the most sophisticated and mature mining 
finance markets in the world, whereas the Hong Kong stock exchange is the destination market of choice 
for Chinese state-controlled companies seeking capital.  As these examples demonstrate, it is not 
uncommon for firms to seek capital markets where similar firms are already established and understood 
by resource holders.  As Hursti and Maula (2007: 838) point out “seeking an investor base that 
‘understands’ the business of the IPO candidate is often cited as the reason for listing overseas.”  Hence, it 
is through a careful examination of their social identity that firms can potentially achieve legitimate status 
with influential capital market actors.  As a result, this enhanced legitimization may lead to a reduction of 
its CMLOF. 
Proposition 7: Organizational isomorphism on the part of the foreign firm negatively 
moderates the relationship between antecedent factors and the extent of CMLOF faced by 
a foreign firm. 
 
Certification by Information Intermediaries 
 As Rao (1994: 31) notes “the very act of endorsement embeds an organization in a status 
hierarchy and thereby builds the reputation of an organization”.  The value of third party endorsements 
(e.g., prestigious underwriters, audit firms, and alliance partners) in reducing the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding security issues is built upon the social status of the certifying organization.  Therefore, a 
relationship with a high-status partner can be considered a powerful endorsement for the unfamiliar firm 
and thus act as a reputational source of legitimacy.   
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 A wide assortment of organizational and extra-organizational attributes that serve as important 
cues regarding the quality of an unfamiliar firm to capital market resource providers have been 
investigated in prior research.  Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999), emphasize the role of “reputational 
intermediaries” in U.S. markets.  These intermediaries include underwriters (in the case of capital-raising 
listings), auditors, debt-rating agencies, securities analysts as well as the exchanges themselves (via listing 
requirements).  They provide additional scrutiny or monitoring that is unavailable in the home markets of 
foreign firms.  These local actors are attractive to foreign investors, because they reduce information 
asymmetry, add value, and provide legitimacy.  They have information about the operation of the local 
market, including access to deal flow as well as dense networks of contacts and also have considerable 
familiarity with the legal requirements of the local market.     
 This analysis suggests that foreign firms can reduce their CMLOF by using means external to an 
organization, such as endorsements and certifications by third parties (banks-underwriters; audit firms, 
private equity investors, etc.).  However, the extent of this endorsement effect is contingent on the 
institutional infrastructure of local capital markets.  In some markets, such as the U.S. stock markets, 
formal arrangements with bank-underwriters and other third parties who act as “gate keepers” may be 
particularly salient means of reducing CMLOF among foreign firms attempting to issue local securities. 
Proposition 8: Endorsements of the foreign firm by reputable third parties negatively 
moderates the relationship between antecedent factors and the extent of CMLOF faced by 
a foreign firm.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 Liability of foreignness has been one of the most researched topics in international business since 
the beginning of the field in the early 1960s.  LOF is central to the development of theories of the 
multinational firm, but most such theories accorded LOF what amounts to a “taken for granted” status.  
Starting with the pioneering work of Zaheer (1995), the last fifteen years have seen a sudden proliferation 
of empirical and theoretical work on LOF and many stimulating intellectual debates on the domain of the 
construct, its measurement, and strategies for overcoming it.  Our study goes beyond product markets and 
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draws attention to issues of LOF faced by the growing number of firms that choose to seek capital 
resources outside of their home capital markets.  We develop a framework to understand both the sources 
of CMLOF and strategies that firms can use to mitigate those costs. 
 Our study draws from the pervasiveness of the ‘home bias’ phenomena among investors around 
the world to explain how firms incur additional costs when raising funds outside of their home capital 
markets.  As firms rush to cross-list their stock in multiple markets and choose to make their capital 
market debut in foreign markets through IPOs, it becomes important to examine the existence of LOF in 
capital markets.  We identify four major types of costs that result in LOF in capital markets.  These are 
institutional distance, information costs, unfamiliarity costs, and costs arising from cultural differences.  
Each of these places the foreign firm at a disadvantage compared to domestic firms in host capital 
markets.  Drawing from institutional and signaling theories we identified four specific strategies that 
firms can use to overcome CMLOF.  These are bonding, signaling, organizational isomorphism, and 
endorsements by third parties.  Together these strategies enhance the legitimacy of the foreign firm and 
level the playing field with respect to local firms vying for capital resources.    
 Expanding the scope of LOF research to include the costs facing firms acquiring resources in host 
capital markets presents a number of exciting research opportunities. These include the role of 
institutional context, potential interactions between product and capital markets and their implications for 
CMLOF, identification of situations where foreignness may convey benefits rather than liabilities, the 
substitutability and complementarities among the mitigation strategies, and the exploration of CMLOF in 
informal capital markets.  Further, the advancement of empirical research on CMLOF requires the 
development of operational measures that are reliable, valid, and easy to use.  Each of these issues is 
discussed next. 
 The recent accumulation of research on the role of institutional context suggests that success of 
specific strategies firms employ to mitigate CMLOF costs may be a function of the institutional 
characteristics of the host country. For example, certain governance signals, such as stock-based 
executive compensation is so prevalent in the U.S. that it has achieved a “taken for granted status” 
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(Sanders & Boivie, 2004: 171) whereas this form of governance signal may be less accepted in other host 
capital markets.  Likewise, large investment banks are relevant social actors in the US capital market, and 
could conceivably confer legitimacy to foreign firms seeking capital on US exchanges.  As these 
examples suggest, it is important to recognize that the ability of governance signals and endorsement to 
reduce LOF costs may be contingent on both home and host institutional environments.  Therefore, the  
impact of the institutional environment of a country on the likelihood of success of specific strategies to 
overcome CMLOF is a promising avenue for further research. 
 A growing body of research in the finance area suggests that there are information spillovers from 
product markets to capital markets.  It has been found that individual investors prefer to invest in stocks 
with easily recognized products and less likely to sell shares of companies they frequent as customers 
(Frieder & Subrahmanyam, 2005).  It has also been found that a firm’s advertising expenditures is related 
to number of both individual and institutional investors as well as liquidity for their common stock and 
higher stock valuation (Chemmanur & Yan, 2009).  The possibility of interaction between product and 
capital markets has been demonstrated in the international context as well.  A number of studies show that 
greater trade between two countries results in increased cross-border asset holdings (Portes & Rey, 2005).  
Research by Sarkissian and Schill (2004) shows that firms choose to raise capital in countries where their 
products are known.  On the other hand, Pagano et al. (2002) argue that a cross-listing can strengthen the 
competitive position of a firm in its industry and increase its foreign sales by enhancing the firm’s brand 
recognition, and reputation with suppliers, employees, and customers.  Further, firms may decide to raise 
capital abroad so that their products can become better known in foreign markets.  Given that LOF exists 
in both product and capital markets, an investigation of their interactions would be an important area for 
future research. 
Although our discussion in this paper is built on the implicit assumption that foreignness carries 
with it inherent liabilities, there may indeed be specific situations where foreignness may actually prove 
beneficial.  First, in the capital market context, investors seek diversification to reduce the risk of their 
portfolios.  Thus, investors are actively looking for foreign stocks and thus foreignness becomes 
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attractive.  Foreign IPOs, cross-listed stocks, and ADRs are particularly attractive in this regard because 
they provide an investor with an easier way to invest in foreign equities without incurring the transaction 
costs of buying a foreign security.  Second, there is a significant body of research in marketing that has 
investigated “country-of-origin” (COO) effects (Peterson & Jolibert, 1995).  COO is an extrinsic product 
cue that influences a customer’s decision to buy or not buy a product.  COO effects can be either positive 
or negative.  For example, French wine, Swiss chocolate and German automobiles carry with them very 
favorable images.  Similarly, when a country is deemed as “hot,” debt and equity instruments issued by 
firms from that country might actually enjoy very favorable response from investors in foreign capital 
markets.  Finally, foreignness can be a benefit when local firms are viewed as less legitimate or even 
illegitimate (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  While there are benefits to foreignness as described above, our 
review of empirical research in finance clearly indicates that the liabilities of foreignness outweigh the 
benefits.  For example, Foerster & Karolyi (2000) found that foreign issues underperformed local market 
benchmarks of comparable firms by 8 to 15 percent over three years following issuance.  
Recent research indicates that corporate governance factors should not be considered in isolation 
from each other, but instead they should be examined as ‘bundles’ of corporate governance practices that 
are aligned with one another and mutually enhance the effectiveness of  those practices.  In a similar 
fashion, our paper has treated the mitigation strategies as a bundle which together could alleviate 
CMLOF.  Future research should evaluate how these legitimation strategies can complement or perhaps 
substitute for one another.   
Much of our discussion in this paper was restricted to CMLOF in formal equity markets because 
firms have traditionally gained access to capital via public capital markets.  However, private equity 
represents an innovation in the ability to provide capital to unquoted firms.  Hence, future research could 
explore the occurrence of CMLOF within informal capital markets.  For example, foreign private equity 
firms entering overseas markets may face higher transactions costs in both identifying and monitoring 
firms to invest in.  By virtue of their foreignness, they also likely experience greater information 
asymmetries.  In addition, studies have shown that CMLOF can have significant impacts on cross-border 
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venture capital activity.  Indeed, cultural differences and geographical distance can create problems in 
cross-border VC investments and can diminish the commitment of venture capitalists in foreign markets 
(Guler & Guillen, 2010; Mäkelä & Maula, 2008).  Future analysis can usefully integrate institutional 
theory and economic sociology research to develop a more holistic view on the antecedent factors and 
moderators of LOF in different institutional contexts. 
  The development of operational measures for CMLOF is critical to advancing empirical research 
on this topic.  There are a number of dimensions along which firms could face challenges that are 
different from what local firms would face, when raising either debt or equity in foreign markets.  For 
example, in the case of foreign IPOs and cross-listings, the foreign firm’s cost of capital compared to 
local firms may provide a benchmark for LOF.  In addition, the extent of underpricing relative to local 
firms after controlling for other firm-specific and industry-specific factors could be a promising measure.  
Also, differences in analyst coverage, trading volume, and investor law suits could provide some 
indication of LOF.  Differences in underwriting fees, if any, and differences in the quality and prestige of 
underwriters and auditors backing firms seeking equity resources in foreign capital markets are other 
potential indicators.  We suggest that another promising way to measure LOF would be to compare 
delisting rates between local and foreign firms.  In the debt market, comparisons of credit ratings, cost of 
debt, and underwriter expense could all be potential indicators of CMLOF.  Finally, in the case of Venture 
Capital, access to such capital, size of syndicate, and number of rounds of financing could each provide 
some measure of the additional challenges that new venture face.  While it is premature to converge on a 
single indicator of LOF in capital markets, the careful examination of many of the indicators suggested 
above can potentially provide valuable insights into the existence of LOF and its magnitude.  
 In this paper we argued for the expansion of the domain of the liabilities of foreignness construct 
to include liabilities faced in capital markets.  The increasingly integrated global capital markets have 
greatly impacted the opportunities available to firms worldwide seeking to lower their costs of capital. 
However, a significant body of literature has demonstrated a pervasive bias among investors against firms 
founded in dissimilar cultural and institutional environments.  Indeed, overcoming investor bias 
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represents real costs to the firm and is a steep challenge to the manager looking to acquire capital 
resources abroad.  We identify a number of causes for investor bias and the resulting CMLOF and suggest 
a range of strategic responses that firms can employ to overcome them.  Future empirical validation of the 
applicability of these mitigation strategies will help firms to develop more effective strategies when 
accessing resources in foreign capital markets.  
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Figure 1   Capital market liabilities of foreignness: Antecedent factors and mitigation strategies  
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NOTES 
 
i
 The majority of our discussion is restricted to equity markets since a rapid integration of equity markets 
was the most pronounced globalization phenomenon over the past decade. 
 
ii
 For instance, the London Stock Exchange introduced the AIM and the Borsa Italiana introduced in early 
2009 the AIM Italia.  The Deutsche Borse contains the Freiverkehr, which is modeled after London’s 
AIM with lower listing requirements.  Similarly, Prague, Hong Kong, and Singapore have also 
subdivided their primary markets in order to compete for small and medium sized firms attempting to 
acquire capital resources. 
 
iii
 Interestingly, the impact of institutional distance between two countries on investor behavior may often 
be asymmetrical.  That is, a Columbian investor may have more information about the U.S. institutional 
context than a U.S. investor may have about Columbia.  Thus, institutional distance may not affect the 
behavior of the investors in the two countries equally. 
